"And no civil suit shall be brought before either of the said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant."

It is, of course, hardly necessary to refer the court to decisions showing the unlawfulness of the issuing to the Marshal of the District of Columbia, in the present case, a summons for the defendant, Crawford, and the unlawfulness of the service and return of that summons by such marshal as to Crawford.

This is so because the express, unambiguous letter of the statute not only does not authorize, but expressly *prohibits* the bringing of any civil suit in either the District or Circuit Court of the United States, against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.

Still, since this summons has been issued, and this suit has been so brought, it may not be amiss to point to some of the decisions, showing how flagrant is the error of so issuing and serving said writ.

It will be kept in mind that by section 11 of the first judiciary act of September 24, 1789, a suit might be brought against a defendant in another district than that in which he was an inhabitant, provided he could be "*found*" in such other district, the words of that act being:

"And no civil suit shall be brought before either of the said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be *found* at the time of serving the writ." (1 Stat., 79.)

So that under this statute a man could be sued in a civil suit away from his district, provided he was "found" in the district where suit was brought, and there served, in a transitory action.

The same provision is retained and re-enacted in the act March 3, 1875 (18 Stats., 470), allowing a man to be sued