power of all courts that its process shall be of no validity beyond its territorial lines. There is nothing in any statute of the United States that gives to the process of the circuit courts of the United States in a civil case any power to bring a party within the jurisdiction of the court when he is not in and cannot be served within the limits of the territory."

He then proceeds to say that the case he was dealing with was not one coming within section 738, allowing defendants, not resident of a district, in a case where the suit *is in equity to enforce a legal or equitable claim against real or personal property*, and that it was one coming within section 738 of the R. S., prohibiting a suit against any inhabitant of the United States in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he might be "found." He reaches the conclusion that the writ in that case must be quashed; and it was.

The case of *ex parte* Schollenberger, 96 U. S., 369, 374, 375, *et seq.*, is one fully analyzing the provisions and operations of the various statutes on this subject, to wit, that found in section 11 of the act of 1789 (1 Stats., 79); also said act of 1875 (18 Stats., 470), and there the court fully elucidates the rule regarding the matter as to when a defendant can be said to be "found" within a district for the purposes of suit.

As already remarked, it seems to us quite useless to cite authorities in support of a proposition of law which depends for its determination upon a statute, and where the statute is explicit and unambiguous and direct in establishing the proposition that a defendant cannot be sued in any district, other than that in which he is an inhabitant, in any civil suit of a transitory character.

But it may not be improper to here give a reference to the cases where these statutes have *recently* come under judicial review in almost every conceivable aspect. These cases are as follows: