

That—

“It is true that a penal law must be construed *strictly* and *according to its letter*. But this strictness, which has run into an aphorism, means no more than that it is to be interpreted *according to its language*.” (Pp. 453, 454.)

That—

“The purpose of the rule is to prevent acts from being brought within the scope of punishment, because *courts may suppose they fall within the spirit of the law, though not within its terms*.” (Citing *Commonwealth v. Cooke*, 50 Pa. St., 201–207, p. 454.)

That—

“The meaning of the rule is, ‘that acts of this kind are not to be regarded as *including anything which is not within their letter* as well as their spirit’” (citing *Dewey v. Goodenough*, 56 Barber, 54), “which is not *clearly and intelligibly described in the very words of the statute, as well as manifestly intended by the Legislature*” (citing Wilb., 246); “that is, the rule of strict construction requires that the *language* shall be so construed that *no cases shall be held to fall within it which do not fall both within the reasonable meaning of its terms, and within the spirit and scope of the enactment*.” (Citing a large number of English authorities in note a.)

That—

“To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its *language must authorize the court to say so*; but it is not admissible to carry the principle that a case which is *within the mischief of a statute is within its provisions*, so far as to punish a crime not specified in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of a kindred character with those which are enumerated.” (Citing other English authorities in note b.)

Here we stop to suggest, what is vital in the present case, and which is derived from the last cited paragraph. The paragraph, in substance, says, that it is not permissible to carry the principle that a case which is within