oes 38.
And in Sturgis v, Wavecrest Realty Co, (1933) 124 Neb. 769,

248 N.%. 78, the omer of s bathing resort vas held not lieble for injurics
received by a bather in diving into shallov water from a -atcrewheel platform —
"hich vas not designed for diving purposes. The plaintiff, a grown man, had
previously dived from a diving tower, which vas in a depner part of the lake

and farther from the shore, and hed gone over the water-vheel several times

before the accident.

It may be of interest to call your attention to a recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case involving the operation of a swimming
pool by a municipality. The opinion in this case (Gebhardt v. Village of LaGrange
Park 354 I11, 234) was ~ritten by Judge Stone and was rendered by the Supreme
Court on October 21, 1933. The principal question discussed vas whether the
operation of a swimming pool is a governmentel or a proprietary function. The
court said that if it be a governmental function the doctrine of resnondeat
superior has no application, and that the village vould not be liable for damages
arising out of the negligence of its servents in thot function, whereas, if the
function be a proprietary one the villnge vould be liable for damages resulting
from the negligence of its servants in the operation of the pool. The court
said that there is substantial contrariety of opinion in the courts of last resort
in this country on this question: that Colorado, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania
and Yest Virginia held thnt the operation of a svimming pool by a municipality
18 not a governmental but a proprietary function and that the States of California,
Kansas, Georgina, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigen, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Iowa take
the opposite vieti, The court concluded that the latter view was supported by
the better reasoning and the vreight of euthority and reversed the judgment for
the plaintiff who was injured ~hile being conveyed, ~ith o number of other
children, from a svimming pool operated by the village, vhich also provided
transportation to and from the pool, located about eight miles outside the village
limits. The opinion of the court was not unanimous, hovever, as Justices Herrick
end Farthing dissented, saying: "We do not think that this is a governmental
function." My om view is that the better rensoning supports the latter vier.

 

To summarize?

In the operation of a natatorium or swimming pool for profit, the
operator is bound by the ordinary rules of negligence. It is his duty to be
reasonably sure thet he is not inviting patrons into danger and to exercise
ordinary care for their safety. het constitutes the exercise of ordinary care
varies with the situation and circumstances of each particular case. Regard
mist be had for the foir adeptability of the contrivances ehd facilities for
their customary or reasonably anticipated use. This involves the duty of being
diligent to seo that the water in the pool is of sufficient depth to make it
reasonably safe for the purpose, or if it be unsafe for that svort with the
use of the facilities furnished, there rrises the duty to warn or caution patrons
by signs or othervfise of the hezards, particulnrly of eny latent or hidden
condition of danger, ond injuries sustained in consequence of a failure to per-
form this duty are compensable. This gros out of the general rule of
negligence that where a person provides accommodations of » public nature, he is
required to use reasonable care and diligence in furnishing end maintaining such
accommodations in a reasonably snfe condition for the purpose for “hich they are
apparently designed and to which they are adnnted. If, for any reason, the
accommodations are not reasonably safe and suitable for the purposes for which
they are ordinarily used in » customary vay, then the public should be excluded
entirely, or appropriate notice of the unsafe and unsuitable condition should be
given end persons varned of the dongers in using them,