Russia Calls the Shots
Thursday, Nov. 15, 1962 University Daily Kansan Page 3
"Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit, and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy."
Red China Bucks Status Quo
Red China seems to be dependent on the Soviet Union for nuclear weapons. Prior to the Sputnik success of their comrades, Red China had attempted to discount nuclear weapons as being decisive in the scales of military superiority.
This is the publicized strategy of Red China as formulated by Mao Tse-tung, and it has been the principal guideline that has directed the Asian country's quest to expand its domain of influence.
PRIOR TO 1957, this was the sum total of Red China's strategy. This strategy was demonstrated in the Korean War where human-wave tactics and other psychological weapons of war did more than gain territory; the goal was to make the next battle more easy to win. Without the "ultimate" weapon—nuclear armaments—Red China would not employ total-victory tactics with purely conventional weapons.
By Terry Murphy
And even if total victory were in sight for Red China, there was the threat that the tide could be changed with nuclear weapons being introduced.
The reason Red China wanted to discount the effectiveness of nuclear weapons prior to 1957 seems obvious—the United States was recognized as superior in the nuclear armaments. But along with the Sputnik came the feasibility of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
THIS WAS NOT to be misinterpreted to mean that the Chinese war lords considered nuclear war to be inevitable. But they professed to have no fear of nuclear war. They reasoned that nuclear war would take a terrible toll in China and Russia, but it would completely devastate the United States and its allies.
For the first time, Red China leaders began telling the world that nuclear weapons could be decisive. They believed, or at least professed to believe, that the USSR and Communist China would win any nuclear war.
The consequences of this dependence have been and will continue to be important.
At this point it would be illuminating to consider a factor which has influenced the strategy and activities of Red China more than any other single consideration; Red China's wide-spread dependence on Russia.
The effective control of Red China through rationing was extended beyond the Russian refusal to supply nuclear weapons.
DURING THE Korean War Russia furnished sufficient conventional weapons—rifles, automatic weapons, artillery, tanks, etc.—but even this supply of nonnuclear weapons was controlled.
Russia has always entered the alliance with Red China with one hard-and-fast rule: Russia shall call the big play. Border wars that contribute to continual unrest are one thing, but the threat of nuclear war is quite another.
Russia has always been willing to indulge and, in most cases, even encourage its Asian ally's aggressions, but always within well-defined limits.
Not until it appeared that United Nations forces might push across the Yalu River did Russia lift the lid on fuel for jet fighters.
If the big bomb is going to be used. Russia wants to call the shot.
THIS ATTITUDE was clearly demonstrated in the Formosan crisis. As long as the Communists confined themselves to shelling Quemoy and Matsu, Russia did nothing to collar the aggression. But when the United States moved the 7th Fleet to the Formosa Straits with the understanding that nuclear weapons would be used if necessary, Red China backed off.
In the study of Red China's strategy, two elements remain nearly constant: Red China's dependence on Russia, and Red China's need to prevent a condition of status oue in the Far East.
As essential and restricting as these elements may be, they should not be overplayed in considering which avenues are open to Red China and her pursuits of political and military objectives.
Why? It has been suggested that Red China knew Russia would not back her under threat of nuclear attack. Some view the Quemoy-Matsu shellings as a cautious test of U.S. intentions in the Far East. Red China wanted to find out what can be gained through bluster and, if the United States proved irresolute, use this fact to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States is a "paper tiger" not to be overrated.
The opportunities for Red China to deny the status quo are plentiful. Laos, Vietnam, and recently India are evidence that the country cannot be completely throttled by her reliance on Russian supplies and technology.
IN ALL THESE places, the conditions are favorable to the Chinese—they fit into Mao's formula for domination and successful campaigns. The theme is clear and the pattern consistent; creation or exploitation of conditions where political economic, psychological means and the waiting game can be employed with effect.
Russia's refusal to write a blank check for backing aggression,
coupled with indications that the United States sensed Russia's re-license, presented Red China with a problem.
Being vulnerable to nuclear attack and the deterring influence this factor entailed, the Chinese needed to try to create circumstances which would guarantee that war would be fought with conventional weapons—where numerical superiority and logistics would favor the Asian power.
Regardless whether it were planned as an objective or not, the atomic moratorium in 1958 may have been agreed to by Russia as a means of placating the Chinese demands for possession of nuclear weapons.
All this may lead the reader to conclude that the only thing which binds Red China to the Soviet Union and the incumbent restrictions is the lack of nuclear capabilities.
SINCE 1958, THE Chinese Communists have concentrated on the old formula: creating situations where conditions favor the use of political, psychological, economic measures built around the patience of a doctrine which teaches the concept that communism inevitably will prevail.
At the same time, this moratorium would not stop the Chinese from developing their own capabilities in nuclear armaments.
Perhaps the Communists have been stopped short of their goals in Southeast Asia. But certainly the prevailing conditions in Laos and Vietnam cannot be considered as defeats for Red China.
FIRST, OF WHAT use is a nuclear weapon without the capability of delivering it to a target? While Red China may explode a bomb in the next five years, its technicians are a long way from developing an ICBM, or for that matter, even a long-range bomber.
Not necessarily. Other problems are inherent to a quasi-industrialized country such as Red China.
Will Red China run its own show after it has developed its own bomb?
Above and beyond the military ties to Russia, Red China's economy and industry are tied to the strings of Russia. The Great Leap seems to have been more an inching forward.
Red China still must depend on Russia, and Russia will use this lever to call the big shots.
The true civilization is where every man gives to every other every right that he claims for himself. — Robert G. Ingersoll
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