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University Daily Kansan Wednesday, April 18, 1962
The U.N.'s Court
Pakistan's permanent representative to the United Nations, Zafrulla Khan, called attention to a often overlooked part of the U.N. machinery in a speech to the International Club Friday night. His topic was the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
The court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It judges only disputes between sovereign powers and only with the consent of the powers involved.
Mr. Khan pointed out that "sovereign states usually prefer to seek solutions through political rather than judicial means." This is because political means offer more chances for arbitration, bargaining and pressure movements.
Mr. Khan's comments concerning the International Court of Justice provide clarification of a little-known and potentially very valuable part of the United Nations. But that potential is not likely to be realized in the foreseeable future.
matters. The U.N. forces in the Congo have long had difficulty in obtaining cooperation from both Congolese and Katangan forces. The refusal of the Soviet Union to admit U.N. observers to Hungary during the 1956 revolution is another example. There are many more.
THE COURT operates under the same difficulties that the whole United Nations faces. It is not only in the court that nations refuse to accept U.N. jurisdiction. There have been many examples of nations refusing to accept the legitimate requests of the United Nations on other
LITTLE MAN ON CAMPUS by Dick Bibler
Of course, all the members of the United Nations have cooperated with it in cases where they are receiving aid from one of the various U.N. organizations such as UNESCO. Naturally none of the sovereign states of the United Nations would think of refusing to cooperate when it is to their advantage.
THERE ARE many underlying factors in this situation. Among them are such things as the intense nationalism of the newly independent nations and the distrust existing between the Communist bloc and the West. These things will continue to be obstacles for many years.
Yet the potential the International Court of Justice has for the peaceful settlement of international disputes remains. If it were used more in the resolving of disputes between antagonistic nations, the continuous danger of war in some part of the world would be lowered.
William H. Mullins
"SOME GUYS NEVER HAVE ANY TROUBLE GETTIN' A GIRL."
Juggernaut: The Warfare State
(Editor's note: This is the third in a series of five excerpts from a special edition of the fiction by Fred J. Cook entitled "Jugnautron: The Warfare State.")
The issue that assumed supreme importance, that hovered over all mankind like a black pall of eventual and inescapable doom, was of course the menace of the bomb, now bloated to hideous hydrogen proportions. In discussing this problem, a basic Russian attitude must be understood. The comprehensive Russian proposal of 1955 had been linked directly to disarmament; the Russians traditionally have insisted, with irrefutable logic, that mere control of arms is a tricky business, far more difficult of enforcement than disarmament itself.
Their publicly professed attitude has been that only full-scale disarmament can relieve world tensions, inspire mutual confidence and bring peace. To achieve this end, they repeatedly expressed their willingness to go the limit in inspections and enforcement because under conditions of disarmament no nation would retain the power to wage "a major war."
THE RUSSIANS, however, have not been willing to open up their country to inspection for the mere purpose of control, with potential enemies insisting on the right to retain war-making arsenals. It is not an illogical attitude, and it represents, furthermore, a Russian policy that dates back to the days of the Czars. In the 1890s Russia was advancing the same arguments, urging total disarmament on the great powers of Europe and meeting then with the same lack of success she has had with us now.
From the time our policy took its radical military shift in the "open skies" and Quarles's big-bomb statements of 1955, our attitude has been that we must have nuclear control first; only then will we discuss disarmament. In advocating this policy, we have also advocated its impossibility, for we have made it clear that, in our view, any adequate control of the bomb simply is not feasible.
Apparently, we have been perfectly content with this dead-end vision, though we have, of course, protested with our usual piousness that, any time controls should become really possible, it would be a different matter and we should be the happiest people on earth. In an effort, then, to make us happy, some of the most eminent scientists of the world were summoned to Geneva to investigate the possibilities in our impossible—the problem of adequate control.
THE SCIENTISTS met on July 1, 1958; they numbered fifteen, and they came from five nations of the West. including the United States, and five nations of the East, including the USSR. For fifty-one
days, they wrestled with the technical problems involved in establishing a detection system for nuclear-weapons testing. If such a system could be established, the testing that was raining radioactive fallout on the world could be halted—an important first step in lowering world tensions. On August 21, 1958, the East-West scientists announced a unanimous conclusion: a nuclear-test ban could be policed effectively.
"This agreement makes an effective dent in a problem which so far has proved rather intractable—the problem of disarmament," the U.N. Secretary General commented.
TO FIRM UP a permanent test-ban treaty, of course, required much bargaining, and the fall months of 1958 were filled with complicated negotiations. But progress, it seemed, was being made. By December 19, four articles of a proposed test-ban treaty had been hammered out, and the prospects for eventual agreement seemed bright when the conferences adjourned for the Christmas holidays.
Throughout the world there was general agreement and relief. Russia, capitalizing on this mood and seizing a propaganda advantage, announced she would suspend nuclear-weapons testing if we would. This, as was doubtless intended, put us on the spot. In the 1956 Presidential campaign, Adalai Stevenson had first called world attention to the invisible death seeping down from the skies and had urged a halt to nuclear testing and nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. Eisenhower had flown into one of his towering rages and denounced the proposal as irresponsible, downright idiotic. Now, less than two years later, it didn't seem quite so idiotic, and the White House, put in the position of having to catch the tail of the Russian kite, announced that it would go along—it would suspend tests for one year, beginning October 31, 1958.
Daily Hansan
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They were scheduled to reassemble on January 5,1959.
NEWS DEPARTMENT
Ron Gallagher  Managing Editor
On that day, in a development timed to coincide exactly with the resumption of the conference, the White House startled the world with a new announcement. Fresh data, it said, showed that underground test explosions were much more difficult to detect than the Geneva experts had thought; the unanimous conclusions of the fifteen eminent East-West scientists who had agreed a control system was possible no longer were accepted as valid by the United States. Again we were drawing back—this time in a gesture that flouted a unanimous finding of the world's best scientific minds. Our action provoked an international uproar. The USSR flatly accused the United States of "looking for an excuse to torpedo the current Geneva talks."
Kim Eckerner Managing Editor
EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT
Bill Mullins
BUSINESS DEPARTMENT
Charles Martinez
Business Manager
OF COURSE, we denied any such intention; we were, as always, pure boys wanting peace and disarmament in the world, our patience sorely tried by such intemperate Russian charges. Our self-righteousness, which has been one of our most offensive characteristics in the field of world opinion, this time served us even worse than usual; for the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee quickly exposed it as a tawdry tissue compounded of outright lies and subtle deceit, its one purpose the scutting of any possibility of agreement at Geneva. . . .
Against this background, the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee began to pry into the validity of the AEC's "new data" that had erected such a roadblock in the path of any possible nuclear-test agreement. Involved were infinite technical complexities; simply stated, the basic issues came down to this: nuclear tests above a certain range of power will register on seismographs, and the vibrations they cause will be distinctly different from those caused by earthquakes. Blasts of lesser power will also register on seismographs, but it will not be clear what caused them—earthquakes or nuclear bombs. To determine this, inspectors would have to go to the scene of each registered disturbance.
EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT
Bill Mullins  Editorial Editor
The delicacy and precision of the scientific instruments of detection thus became all-important; for if instruments could not record, sift out and identify the nature of the vast majority of earth tremors, so many on-site inspections would have to be made that the whole detection system would be overwhelmed by physical impossibilities.
THE SOVIETS contended that we were deliberately falsifying scientific data to prove the impossibility. They argued that some of
our data, taken from temporary our stations set up to monitor our tests in the past, were by no means as reliable as data obtainable from up-to-date stations—and even this last data would not be as good as could be obtained from the still more efficient system the fifteen East-West scientists at Geneva had perfected.
Before the Humphrey Subcommittee, Dr. Hans Bethe, a leading world scientist who had represented the United States at Geneva, upheld in essence the Soviet contention. He testified that the controls devised at Geneva were better than those used to monitor U.S. tests in 1958 and "much better than almost any now existent station."
Another key contention, based on the AEC's "new data," received rough handling by America's own experts before the Humphrey group. The point involved was the size of the explosions whose nature could be determined by scientific instruments. The new calculations showed that there was a much greater margin of error here than the Geneva experts had supposed; and if this were true, of course, the number of necessary on-the-spot inspections would be multiplied to unmanageable proportions.
THE RUSSIANS had charged that our "new data" were not accurate, adding significantly "as the U.S. authors themselves admit."
Such admission, indeed, was wrung from U.S. experts by the Humphrey Subcommittee. It became clear that the AEC's "new data" simply could not be supported scientifically; our own experts were compelled to admit that, under the controls devised at Geneva, no significant cheating would be possible. Philip J. Farley, special assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament, put it this way: "It is very unlikely that anyone could achieve a significant new nuclear capability or a significant improvement in his existing capability without being clearly and publicly in the position of having violated or otherwise evaded the agreement."
When one's own officials cannot support one's own publicly announced policy, the whole affair becomes embarrassing; and even if powerful fortes behind the scenes remain disenchanted, there really isn't any way, if one is to save any face at all, to call the whole business off. So once more the talks progressed at Geneva, with scientists devoting their attention to surmounting the Americans' "new data" roadblock. In the meantime, international tensions showed signs of easing. Russian Deputy Premier Mikoyan visited the United States; Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain had a series of talks with Premier Khrushchev; and the fateful Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange of visits was arranged.
Note From World Crisis Day Committee
Editor:
The World Crisis Committee wishes to thank the students and faculty for their participation in World Crisis Day, 1961. We particularly wish to thank Chancellor Wescoe for his consistent support and encouragement of World Crisis Day, even in the face of determined criticism and opposition. We hope for continued support for all World Crisis Day participants of a series of forthcoming public affairs activities.
Robert Searcy,
co-ordinator
World cricket Committee
Lewrence junior
More on Senior Pictures Editor:
As a final rejoinder to the balderdash being cast about over senior pictures (re: Daily Kansan, April 13). I have several comments. Item: The tetrician exaltation of deeds like that of Miss Wise "called all the presidents of all organized houses . . . ") doesn't in
any way denote effectiveness. What about the hundreds who don't live in organized houses. Miss Wise?
ITEM: THE "two-column advertisements in the Jan. 8 and Jan. 11 issues of the Daily Kansan urging seniors to have their pictures taken . . ." (Kansan, April 13) specified no deadline, as I previously stated (Kansan, April 11). Also, Jan. 11 was last semester. Where are the notices from this semester?
Instead of grandiose panegyrics on the sedulous care with which the senior picture set-up was handled (bungled) this year, I would suggest an honest effort to straighten things out. No amount of unrealistic back-slapping will erase the fact that less than half of the senior class will be in the yearbook, as it now stands. Again, I would urge all seniors who still want a picture to call Mr. Estes, write a letter, sign a petition, or in some way convey your sentiments on the subject to him as soon as possible.
John F. Ryland Caldwell senior